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Abstract—This paper aims to evaluate the safety of a pixel-
based image encryption method, which has been proposed to
apply images with no visual information to deep neural networks
(DNN), in terms of robustness against ciphertext-only attacks
(COA). In addition, we propose a novel DNN-based COA that
aims to reconstruct the visual information of encrypted images.
The effectiveness of the proposed attack is evaluated under two
encryption key conditions: same encryption key, and different
encryption keys. The results show that the proposed attack can
recover the visual information of the encrypted images if images
are encrypted under same encryption key. Otherwise, the pixel-
based image encryption method has robustness against COA.
I. INTRODUCTION
The spread of deep neural networks (DNNs) has greatly
contributed to solving complex tasks for many applications
[1], [2], such as for computer vision, biomedical systems,
and information technology. Deep learning utilizes a large
amount of data to extract representations of relevant features,
so the performance is significantly improved [3], [4]. However,
there are security issues when using deep learning in cloud
environments to train and test data, such as data privacy, data
leakage, and unauthorized data access. Therefore, privacy-
preserving DNNs have become an urgent challenge.
Various methods have been proposed for privacy-preserving
computation. The methods are classified into two types: per-
ceptual encryption-based [5]–[16] and homomorphic encryp-
tion (HE)-based [17]–[25]. HE-based methods are the most
secure options for privacy preserving computation, but they
are applied to only limited DNNs [21]–[25]. Therefore, the
HE-based type does not support state-of-the-art DNNs yet.
Moreover, data augmentation has to be done before encryption.
In contrast, perceptual encryption-based methods have been
seeking a trade-off in security to enable other requirements,
such as a low processing demand, bitstream compliance,
and signal processing in the encrypted domain [5]–[16]. A
few methods were applied to machine learning algorithms
in previous works [5], [6]. The first encryption method [9]–
[14] to be proposed for encryption-then-compression (EtC)
systems, was demonstrated to be applicable to traditional
machine learning algorithms, such as support vector machine
(SVM) [5]. However, the block-based encryption method has
never been applied to DNNs.
Although a block-based encryption method [6] was applied
to image classification with DNNs, in which an adaption
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network is added prior to DNNs to avoid the influence of
image encryption, the classification performance is inadequate.
A pixel-based image image encryption method [26] was
proposed not only to improve the classification performance
of the privacy-preserving DNNs but also to consider data
augmentation in the encrypted domain. However, the security
level of these encryption methods is only evaluated in terms
of the key space analysis for brute-force attack.
In this paper, we aim to evaluate the safety of the
pixel-based image encryption in terms of robustness against
ciphertext-only attacks (COA), including a new attack called
DNN-based ciphertext-only attack. Moreover, the effectiveness
of the proposed attack is evaluated under two encryption key
conditions: same encryption key, and different encryption keys.
II. SECURITY EVALUATION OF PIXEL-BASED IMAGE
ENCRYPTION
A. Privacy-Preserving Deep Neural Networks
Figure 1 illustrates the scenario for privacy-preserving
DNNs used in this paper. In the training process, a client u
encrypts each training image, ITr,i, i = 1, 2, . . . , g, by using a
secret key set for training data,KTr,i, and sends the encrypted
images (IeTr,i) to a cloud server.
In the testing process, the client u encrypts a testing image
(ITe) by using a secret key set for testing data,KTe, and sends
the encrypted image Ie,Te to the server. The server solves
a classification problem with an image classification model
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Fig. 3: Examples of images encrypted by proposed method
trained in advance, and then returns the classification results
to the client.
In this paper, we assume that there are two encryption key
conditions for generating encrypted images as follows.
• Same encryption key: All training and testing images
are encrypted by using only one secret key, i.e. KTr,1 =
KTr,2 = . . . = KTr,g = KTe = K.
• Different encryption keys: The different secret keys are
randomly assigned to training and testing images, i.e.
KTr,1 6= KTr,2 6= . . . 6= KTr,g 6= KTe.
B. Pixel-Based Image Encryption
Figure 2 illustrates the encryption steps of the pixel-based
image encryption [26]. To generate an encrypted image (Ie,i)
from a color image, Ii, the following steps are carried out, as
shown in Fig. 2. Note that the color shuffling (Step 3) is an
optional encryption step to enhance security.
1) Divide Ii with X × Y pixels into pixels.
2) Individually apply negative-positive transformation to
each pixel of each color channel, IR,i, IG,i, and IB,i, by
using a random binary integer generated by secret keys
Kc,i = {KR,i,KG,i,KB,i}. In this step, a transformed
pixel value of the j-th pixel, p′, is calculated using
p′ =
{
p (r(j) = 0)
p⊕ (2L − 1) (r(j) = 1)
, (1)
where r(j) is a random binary integer generated by Kc,i.
p is the pixel value of the original image with L bit per
pixel. The value of the occurrence probability P (r(j)) =
0.5 is used to invert bits randomly [13].
3) (Optional) Shuffle three color components of each pixel
by using an integer randomly selected from six integers
generated by a key Ks,i as shown in Table I.
TABLE I: Permutation of color components for random in-
teger. For example, if random integer is equal to 2, red
component is replaced by green one, and green component
is replaced by red one while blue component is not replaced.
Random Integer
Three Color Channels
R G B
0 R G B
1 R B G
2 G R B
3 G B R
4 B R G
5 B G R
Images encrypted by using the pixel-based method are
illustrated in Fig. 3(b) and 3(c), where Fig. 3(a) is the original
one.
III. ROBUSTNESS AGAINST CIPHERTEXT-ONLY ATTACKS
Security mostly refers to protection from adversarial forces.
Various attacking strategies, such as the known-plaintext attack
(KPA) and chosen-plaintext attack (CPA), should be consid-
ered [11]–[13]. In this paper, we consider brute-force attacks
and propose a novel DNN-based ciphertext-only attack as
ciphertext-only attacks (COA).
A. Brute-force Attack
If a color image IRGB with X × Y pixels is divided into
pixels, the number of pixels n is given by
n = X × Y. (2)
The key spaces of negative-positive transformation (Nnp)
and color component shuffling (Ncol) are represented by
Nnp(n) = 2
3n, Ncol(n) =
(
3P 3
)n
= 6n. (3)
Consequently, the key space of images encrypted by using
the proposed encryption scheme, N(n), is represented by the
following.
N(n) = Nnp(n) ·Ncol(n)
= 23n · 6n
(4)
B. DNN-based Ciphertext-only Attack
We propose a novel DNN-based COA that aims to recon-
struct the visual information of encrypted images. Since the
encryption method is a pixel-based one, the proposed DNN for
COA consists of three 1×1-locally connected layers, which
work similarly to 1×1-convolution layer, except that weights
are unshared. Figure 4 illustrates the proposed attack where
C
Mj
j is the j-th locally connected layer of the network with
a kernel size and stride of (1,1), Mj is the number of feature
maps of the j-th locally connected layer, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, and
I ′i denotes a reconstructed image. The representations of each
encrypted pixel are extracted in the first two layers, and then
the reconstructed pixels are obtained by the last layer.
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Fig. 4: Proposed DNN-based plaintext-only attack
(a) Same encryption keys (b) Different encryption
key
Fig. 5: Examples of reconstructed images from the images
encrypted by the negative-positive transformation and color
shuffling.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
A. Experimental Set-up
We employed STL-10 dataset, which contains 96×96 pixel
color images and consists of 5,000 training images and 8,000
testing images [27].
In the experiment, the numbers of feature maps, M1, M2,
and M3, were set to 8, 32, and 3, respectively.
The network was trained by using stochastic gradient
descent (SGD) with momentum for 70 epochs, and used
mean squared error (MSE), which compares the differences
between the reconstructed images and the original ones, as a
loss function. The learning rate was initially set to 0.1 and
decreased by a factor of 10 at 40 and 60 epochs. We used a
weight decay of 0.0005, a momentum of 0.9, and a batch size
of 128.
B. Results and Discussions
Examples of reconstructed images under the use of same
and different encryption keys are shown in Fig. 5, where
Fig. 3(a) is the original one. The visual information of the
reconstructed images was recovered by the proposed scheme
if the images are encrypted under same encryption key, as
shown in Fig. 5(a). This is because each image was encrypted
with only one pattern, so the proposed attack can recognize the
pattern and recover the visual information by comparing the
difference between reconstructed images and original images.
TABLE II: Average SSIM of the reconstructed images com-
pared with the original ones.
Key Conditions Encryption SSIM
Same encryption key
Step 2 0.1732
Step 2 and 3 0.1715
Different encryption keys
Step 2 0.0424
Step 2 and 3 0.0425
In comparison, the pixel-based encryption method has robust-
ness against COA if the training images are encrypted by using
different encryption keys. Therefore, the visual information
cannot be recovered, as shown in Fig. 5(b).
Table II shows that the structural similarity (SSIM) values
of the encrypted images under the use of same encryption key
were much higher than under the use of different encryption
keys.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper aimed to evaluate the safety of the pixel-based
image encryption method in terms of robustness against COA.
In addition, we proposed a novel DNN-based COA that aims
to reconstruct the visual information of encrypted images.
The effectiveness of the proposed attack was evaluated under
two encryption key conditions: same encryption key, and
different encryption keys. The experimental results showed
that the proposed attack can recover the visual information
of the encrypted images if images are encrypted under same
encryption key. In contrast, it was proved that the pixel-
based image encryption method has robustness against COA
if images are encrypted under different encryption keys.
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